- Monetary policy is conducted to
anchor expectations consistently with the announced target
- The monetary authority should have
a high degree of transparency
- The monetary authority should be
accountable and should explain why has taken a given decision
- The existence of lags makes almost
impossible to keep inflation on target at all times
- A successful monetary policy also
depends on other economic policies that make the task of monetary
policy easier and more credible
A
key element in monetary policy is the ability of the Central
to communicate its decisions in a clear and transparent way
to the public. In particular, it is fundamental that the monetary
authority provides the public a sound explanation of the current
state of the economy and a consistent description of how the
economy may evolve in the future to support its decisions. For
that purpose, the Banco de la República,
as many other Central Banks around the world, has maintained
a macroeconomic model for the quarterly forecast process as
well as for monetary policy analysis. (See Webpondo’s Models at Central Banks) The results of the
analysis and forecasts are condensed in a quarterly Inflation Report, as well
as in the Report
to the Congress.
This
note aims to describe and explain the role and nature of a model
in an inflation targeting regime. I support the view that any
model should be based on solid theoretical economic principles,
given the state of knowledge. The note is divided in three parts:
The first one, describes the role of any model in the monetary
policy decision process. It explains what I consider are the
central characteristics that a model should meet in order to
be a useful tool in this process. The second part briefly describes
the "menu" of models available to a Central Bank. Finally, I
argue in favour of using dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
models for policy decisions.
The
role of a Model for Monetary Policy
Here
is how the theory says that monetary policy should be conduct
in paradise: first, setup the model. This model should be an
explicit dynamic, multi-sector general equilibrium model that
specifies the agent's optimization problems, the markets in
which agents can trade in, the information at agents' disposal
and the law of motion of shocks. The second step is to estimate
the unknown parameters of the model to obtain a complete description
of the data generating process. Third, we solve a Ramsey problem:
that is, we find a map from shocks impacting on the economy
to policy instruments. Once we have this, we can replace the
Central Bank with our Ramsey rule.
Of
course we are not in paradise and we must recognize that monetary
policy faces many challenges. There is no such a thing as a
"true model" and even in the event that there is a structural
and invariant one, the estimation of its parameters is still
problematic: for instance the classical simultaneous equations
procedure based on asymptotic distribution theory assumes that
sample size is very large relative to the number of parameters
being estimated. Clearly, this condition is very difficult to
meet in practice. In consequence, there will always be a role
for judgement in any forecasting exercise.
A
fundamental question is: what is the role of a model in an inflation
targeting strategy? For me, it's role is to facilitate the communication
of monetary policy decisions and make them more transparent
to the public. The idea is simple: since the target is set in
quantitative terms, and the policy decision is taken in quantitative
terms, why should our diagnostic of the current state of the
economy and its likely evolution be communicated in qualitative
terms? The language that a Central Bank uses to communicate
its decisions to the public should be clear and consistent.
A model provides the discipline to understand the economy and
furthermore provides a unified, structured and consistent language.
Here
is what I consider the main characteristics that a model should
have in order to serve as the core of any Forecasting and Policy
Analysis System (FPAS) for a Central Bank. Recall that the main
purpose of any model is to support the Inflation Targeting strategy.
The success of the strategy depends crucially on the ability
of the Central Bank to anchor expectations. Agent expectations
usually are formed taking all information available to them
at a given moment. A model is a key part of that information
set. If the model is based on sound economic principles and
it is communicated in a simple language agents will "buy" the
model more easily, facilitating the job of the Central Bank.
Therefore one should build a model that is:
- theoretically rich but tractable,
consistent, coherent and explicable at the same time
- useful for contrasting competing
economic stories
- able to match the main properties
and facts of the Colombian data
- reliable and efficient under different
forecasting assumptions
- flexible to the imposition of judgemental
adjustments
These
“desirable” features articulate not only the external policy
of the Central Bank but also the operations within the Bank
in the following sense: the model is the anchor of the research
agenda for the Bank as well as its institutional language.
In the next section, I will briefly describe the different types
of models available to the Central Banks and their ability to
satisfy the policy maker’s needs.
The Menu
Central
Banks have a wide variety of models for forecast and policy
analysis: time series models (VAR’s, for example), simultaneous
equations econometric models, small semi-structural theory-based
models and dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models.
We can start comparing the models in terms of their forecast
accuracy and theoretical consistency (criteria 1 and 3 above).
In terms forecasting accuracy, unlike semi-structural and structural
models, time series models perform really well in the short-run
(up to 4 quarters). However, in terms of explicability it is
virtually impossible to obtain a coherent economic story that
forms the basis of a policy decision. That basically hinders
the possibility of using time-series models of being used as
the main tool for communicating and explaining policy decisions.
On
the other side we have more “theory-structured” models for monetary
policy analysis. I would say there are two main groups: the semi-structural
models and the DSGE models. Typically, in a semi-structural model
the variables are flows, gaps and rates. Their inter-temporal
evolution is determined by a subset of economic relations: a Phillips
curve, an IS curve, an interest rate policy rule, a Fisher equation
and an Uncovered Interest Rate Parity condition in the case in
which an open economy is being modelled.
Mathematically, these types of models are a system of dynamic
linear stochastic difference equations. It is common practice
to “calibrate”
the parameters of the model so as to replicate the main features
of the data as well as to guarantee a subset of desirable theoretical
properties.
Semi-structural
models are very popular among Central Banks.
They have proven to be a very useful tool for disciplining the
discussion about the current state of the economy, its possible
future evolution and the main risks that the Board faces. At
the same time, they have improved the internal communication
between the staff and the Board and the external communication
between the Board and the public. However Central Banks have
quickly recognized that these models have three important limitations:
1. There are no market clearing conditions
2. All parameters in the model are subject to the
Lucas critique
3. The aggregate description of the economy is consistent
with different microeconomic stories
Many
of these problems are inherent to the nature of the model itself.
The fact that we use only a subset of semi-structural economic
relationships, with no specifications about the agents, the
markets and their interaction limits the scope, the consistency
and the interpretability of the model. The consequence is that
the language used to support the monetary policy decisions is
usually vague and sometimes even inconsistent. This poses an
undesirable risk to the conduct of monetary policy: the IT strategy
is limited by the nature of the model used to communicate monetary
policy decisions.
The
DSGE models can overcome most of the objections to the semi-structural
models, but at the same time present new challenges to the modellers.
DSGE models define clearly what the households, the firms and
the government do. The agents meet in the markets. Their interaction
defines precisely the economic outcome. Furthermore, all the
goods in the economy are listed as well as its associated market
structure. As a result, the outcomes in these models are consistent
with explicit constrained optimization problems for each agent
and the restrictions imposed by markets. Therefore there is
little room for inconsistencies within the stock-flow accounting
(provided the model is correctly designed). These features make
DSGE models attractive to build economic stories.
There
are however some challenges. These models are difficult to estimate
not only because of their nonlinearity, but also because their
structure imposes clear cross equation restrictions to the dynamics
of the observed data (see Professor
Cole’s interview with Webpondo). Finally, depending on the
model, there may be situations in which some
of the parameters of these models may
be subject to the Lucas critique. Ultimately, in practice it
is very difficult to build a model that is immune to the Lucas
critique.
The Key Question
The
relevant practical question for the Board of a Central Bank
is: do the benefits of using a DSGE model for policy analysis
and forecast outweigh the costs of not doing so? I think the
answer is affirmative. I have already mentioned some theoretical
(and technical) reasons. However, at the practical level, the
policy level, there is a simpler reason: if we agree that one
of these models is a reasonable description of the general structure
of the economy, its internal consistency will be able to support:
1. the process of taking policy decisions
2. the communication of the decisions to the public
3. the problem of anchoring the private agent’s
expectations
4. the process of having the Board accountable for
their decisions
5. the implementation of the Inflation Strategy
in general
Another
reason is to look outwards. It is interesting to observe the
trends in modelling strategies at other Central Banks around
the world. The recent experience of several inflation targeting
central banks (Bank of England, the Bank of Canada, the Riksbank, the Bank of Japan, to name a few) shows that a full
structural model is a step forward in satisfying these criteria
(see the Workshop on DSGE's at Central Banks 2004).
Finally,
one aspect that is crucial to understand about the use of models
for the conduction of monetary policy is that there is no such
a thing as "the model". Building a model is always an on-going
process: it is subject of discussion, revision, adjustment and
change. A model will always be conditioned on the state of knowledge
about the theory and the empirical evidence. The challenge is
for researchers and professional economists to increase the
stock of knowledge that supports the policy decisions. There
should be no reason to limit the process of monetary policy
decisions by using anything different than the state of the
art. This, I think, is the basic principle of good economic
policy.